Conventional block-based multicast authentication schemes overlook the heterogeneity of receivers by letting the sender choose the block size, divide a multicast stream into blocks, associate each block with a signature, and spread the effect of the signature across all the packets in the block through hash graphs or coding algorithms.
The correlation among packets makes them vulnerable to packet loss, which is inherent in the Internet and wireless networks. Moreover, the lack of Denial of Service (DoS) resilience renders most of them vulnerable to packet injection in hostile environments.
Efficiency and packet loss resilience can hardly be supported simultaneously by conventional multicast schemes.
As is well known that existing digital signature algorithms are computationally expensive, the ideal approach of signing and verifying each packet independently raises a serious challenge to resource-constrained devices.
They are suitable for RSA which is expensive on signing while cheap on verifying. For each packet, however, each receiver needs to perform one more verification on its one-time or k-time signature plus one ordinary signature verification. Moreover, the length of one-time signature is too long (on the order of 1,000 bytes).
We propose a novel multicast authentication protocol, namely MABS, including two schemes.
The basic scheme (MABS-B) eliminates the correlation among packets and thus provides the perfect resilience to packet loss, and it is also efficient in terms of latency, computation, and communication overhead due to an efficient cryptographic primitive called batch signature, which supports the authentication of any number of packets, Simultaneously.
- Network model
- DSA key generation.
- Digital Signature (sending packets)
- Signature Verification (receiving packets).